Mr. President, the

American people should realize and understand

that in his press conference

just 2 days ago, President Clinton

talked about the justification for

United States-led airstrikes against

Serbian troops in Kosovo and that

today we are apparently within hours—

within hours—of going to war. He acknowledged

that our U.S. pilots would

be put at risk. And last week, the Pentagon’s

top military commanders also

warned those of us on the Senate

Armed Services Committee that there

could be U.S. casualties if NATO

launches airstrikes in an effort to pressure

President Milosevic to accept the

peace agreement that has been drafted

by the U.S. and its allies and apparently

signed by the Kosovar Albanians.

General Michael Ryan, the Air Force

Chief of Staff, said this:

Our Marine Corps Commandant

Charles Krulak said:

General Krulak also said there were

some bottom-line questions that still

need to be answered: What is the end

game? What happens if the Serbs do

not come to the table after the first

airstrike? How long will the strikes go

on? Will our allies stay with us?

General Dennis Reimer, the Army

Chief of Staff, also discussed the probability—

and I emphasize the word

‘‘probability’’—of sending 4,000 U.S.

troops as part of the NATO peacekeeping

force. He said:

General Reimer agreed with the

chairman of the committee, Senator

JOHN WARNER, who warned of the massing

of Serbian troops on the border of

Kosovo preparing for extensive ground

operations.

Mr. President, my colleagues and the

American public should understand,

notwithstanding yet another round of

last-minute diplomatic efforts by the

administration’s special envoy and the

architect of U.S. policy in the Balkans,

Richard Holbrooke, who is meeting

with Mr. Milosevic as of today, the

United States is preparing to go to war

against the sovereign country of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and

this air attack is very likely to be followed

by U.S. ground troops.

As former Senator Bob Dole said on

‘‘Meet the Press’’ yesterday, it is time

for the U.S. to fish or cut bait in the

Balkans.

Compounding the situation is the

fact that the Russian Prime Minister,

Mr. Primakov, a staunch opponent of

airstrikes and an ally of Milosevic, will

be in Washington tomorrow, and I

think his visit really presents a unique

problem. An attack during Primakov’s

visit would certainly not help repair

frayed U.S. and Russian relations.

However, he is not due to leave until

Friday. In a real paradox, by meeting

with Mr. Primakov this week and delaying

the attack, the administration

may well give Mr. Milosevic additional

time to launch an offensive, an offensive,

by the way, which is also happening

now.

General Wesley Clark, the NATO

commander, has warned time and again

that if no accord is reached, the Serb

forces will resume fighting on a very

large scale, and that is happening.

As the debate showed in the House of

Representatives several weeks ago, and

as the debate also continues in this

body as of today and tomorrow, many

in the Congress are concerned and frustrated

and torn. Some support airstrikes

and some do not. Some support

ground troops; more do not. But we all

agree, I think, that the Congress and

the American people certainly deserve

a better explanation of the administration’s

policy in the Balkans.

It is not that we have not asked the

administration for clarification. Last

July, I offered an amendment to the

defense appropriations bill that required

the President to come before the

American people and the Congress before

he committed the U.S. to a military

involvement in Kosovo. The

amendment was not prejudicial. It simply

required the President to make the

case as to why intervention in Kosovo

was in our vital national security interest.

The language contained in section

8115 of Public Law 105–262—and it is the

law of the land—unambiguously states

that none of the funds appropriated or

otherwise made available under the act

may be obligated or expended for any

additional deployment of the Armed

Forces of the United States unless and

until the President, in consultation

with the leadership of the Congress,

transmits to Congress a report that includes

the following:

No. 1: certification that the presence

of those forces to be deployed is necessary

to the national security interests

of the United States;

No. 2: the reasons why the deployment

is in the national security interest;

No. 3: the number of military personnel

to be deployed;

No. 4: the mission and objectives of

forces to be deployed;

No. 5: the expected time schedule for

accomplishing the objectives of the deployment;

No. 6: the exit strategy;

No. 7: the costs;

And lastly,

No. 8: the anticipated effects on the

morale, the retention and the effectiveness

of United States forces.

Mr. President, although our United

States pilots are about to take part in

an air attack that will put them in

harm’s way, to be followed by some

4,000 ground troops, that report—that

report—required by law—has not been

submitted to the Congress.

Last week, in the briefing that was

conducted by Secretary of State

Albright, National Security Council

Chairman Berger, and Secretary of Defense

Cohen, I again asked if the report

would be forthcoming. I asked if the

latest briefing—requested, by the way,

by our Majority Leader LOTT—served

in lieu of the report. The response of

Mr. Berger was unclear to me, but in

past conversations in previous briefings

he said the administration should

and could answer all the questions involved,

and that the report would be

made ‘‘at the appropriate time.’’

With the attack imminent, it would

seem now is the appropriate time. As a

matter of fact, with all due respect to

the administration, submitting such a

report would not be difficult and it

would be helpful. If the administration

thinks—and they apparently think—

that this is the case, that threats of

military action may alter the behavior

of the Serbs, of Milosevic, what clearer

signal of intent to forcibly stop the violence

against the Albanians than the

President of the United States laying

out the issues to Congress and the

American people?

Perhaps we can do the administration

a favor today. In answering these

questions, required by public law, let

us simply take public statements from

the President and his Cabinet officers,

as well as statements made in briefings

to the Congress that have been reported

in the public press.

As a Member of both the Senate

Armed Services and Intelligence Committees,

I want to emphasize there

should not and cannot be any disclosure

of military details of any proposed

action, the timing of the action or the

types or selection of various weapon

platforms.

Let’s take the reporting requirements—

1, 2, and then 4. They ask the

President to describe why deploying to

Kosovo is in the national security interest

of the United States as well as

what specific objectives our forces will

have once on the ground in the province.

They are of particular importance because

it will be these goals for which

our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines

will be risking their lives. Let me

put it another way. Should a father, a

mother, a husband or a wife—or any

family member—have to ask, ‘‘For

what did my son or daughter, husband

or wife, mom or dad die for?’’ the answers

to these questions will have to

suffice.

Questions Nos. 1 and 2:

Certify the presence of forces to be

deployed is necessary to the national

security interests of the United States

and the reasons why the deployment is

in the national security interest.

Here is the answer that I am suggesting

to the Clinton administration.

President Clinton, taken from President

Clinton’s press conference last

Friday: It could be in the report. I am

quoting the President:

The President went on to say:

I continue to quote the President:

And then the President goes on to

specifically talk about why he thinks

this is in our national interest. And it

should be made part of the report, if he

would simply submit it to the congressional

leadership. He said:

Finally, the President said this:

Here is another answer that the administration

could include in the report

to the Congress as justification for

an attack on Serbia and whether or not

this is in our vital national interest.

Secretary of State Albright: This is

taken from press accounts of congressional

briefings. Six reasons:

No. 1: the Balkans represent a bridge

between Europe and the Middle East

and therefore are of strategic interest.

No. 2: unless we stop this conflict, it

will spin into Albania, Macedonia,

Greece and Turkey. The First World

War started there. Another could

again.

No. 3: we have a humanitarian obligation

to stop massacres and refugee

flight.

No. 4: what we do in Kosovo has a direct

bearing on what has been achieved

in Bosnia.

No. 5: what we do in Kosovo represents

our leadership role in NATO,

the credibility of NATO; both relevant

to the future of NATO into the next

century.

And lastly, No. 6: it is in our national

interest to oppose Serb aggression.

One more answer: Undersecretary of

State Thomas Pickering, before the

Senate Armed Services Committee,

February 25, 1999:

Now, there, I have submitted the administration’s

report as to why this is

in our national interest, a report that

has not been forthcoming, by simply

quoting the President, the Secretary of

State, and the Undersecretary of State.

Whether or not you think that adds up

to a rationale as to why we should be

going to war is another question, but

at least it is there.

Question No. 3 that is required by

public law: Please provide the number

of military personnel to be deployed.

Answer: In numerous press reports,

President Clinton and various defense

officials have stated the United States

will commit up to 4,000 troops for deployment

to enforce a peace agreement.

However, the number of U.S. personnel

who provide intelligence,

logistical support, extraction capability,

and offshore platforms is not

available.

Question No. 4: What are the mission

and objectives of the forces to be deployed?

Answer: In regard to the airstrike,

the press reports as of today state:

The report went on to say:

Just for the record again, the same

press reports stress senior U.S. military

officers have warned the Congress

the air mission over Serbia would be

tremendously dangerous with a high

risk of NATO casualties.

Question No. 5, as required in the report:

The expected schedule for accomplishing

the objectives of the deployment.

Answer: It is not available—or at

least it is not available on all the press

reports, the briefings, and the information

I have been able to obtain in regard

to this weekend and in many previous

months.

Question No. 6: The exit strategy for

the United States forces engaged in the

deployment.

I want all of my colleagues to pay attention

to this response; this is the

exit strategy.

Answer: American negotiator Christopher

Hill, in discussing the negotiated

peace agreement, has stated in

the press that under the agreement,

Serbia would remain sovereign over

Kosovo for the next 3 years. Under the

NATO peacekeeping force, including

the 4,000 Americans, the Kosovo Liberation

Army would disband and the

Serbs would withdraw all but security

forces.

That is certainly not the case as of

today. However, Under Secretary of

State Thomas Pickering, again, in a

very cogent and a very comprehensive

briefing in response said before the

committee February 25:

One, military stability including the

swift and orderly departure of all Serb

forces except those required for border

security; two, replacement of Serb security

forces with a functioning, local,

representative police force; elections

that meet international standards; and

establishment of legitimate political

institutions that would provide for substantial

and sustained Kosovar autonomy.

That is a pretty tall order. That is a

pretty tall order. We have seen the situation

in Bosnia where we were to be

there for 1 year; we have been there for

4 so far. It is now $10 to $12 billion. As

we learned in the Balkans, time limits

don’t mean too much.

Question No. 7, as required by the

amendment in the defense appropriations

bill in regard to a report that has

not been forthcoming: The costs associated

with the deployment and the funding

sources for paying these costs.

Answer: Assistant Secretary of Defense

Kenneth Bacon on February 29:

We have calculated or estimated the

cost of what it would be to send the

U.S. portion of a peacekeeping force

into Kosovo. That would be about $1.5

to $2 billion a year but no decision will

be made on sending peacekeepers in

until there is a peace agreement.

Again, the Under Secretary of State

Thomas Pickering, who has been very

candid before the Senate Armed Services

Committee, ‘‘An additional important

element’’—now, just stop here for

a minute. It will be $2 billion a year at

least for 3 years and perhaps more.

Then, Under Secretary of State

Thomas Pickering in a very candid

statement said:

The thought has just occurred to me,

if we have airstrikes in Kosovo and

Serbia and we destroy the infrastructure,

we are now making the promise

to send funds to repair the damaged

infrastructure—

It seems to me, Mr. President, that

will add up to a great deal more money

than the $2 billion a year. I can find no

statement by the administration as to

how they will request these funds. I assume

they would come under an emergency

supplemental, very similar to

the one we are discussing on the floor

today.

Finally, question No. 8: The anticipated

effects of the deployment on the

morale, retention, and effectiveness of

the United States forces.

While I think this is certainly needed,

there is no answer that is available.

So that is it. Albeit, with very limited

time and access to information

over this weekend, and probably with

some degree a lack of expertise, I have

tried to piece together the response

that the administration could make

within a consultation requirement—a

requirement again stated in public

law—that would certainly help in the

debate we are having today in regard

to U.S. policy in the Balkans.

I have to say, with all due respect to

the rationale behind this policy, I believe

there are a great many more

questions that remain that should have

been answered before now, before, once

again, U.S. credibility is on the line. As

a matter of fact, last Friday the situation

was summed up aptly by Mr. Fred

Hiatt, a columnist with the Washington

Post. The column was entitled

‘‘The Credibility Factor.’’ I ask unanimous

consent to have the full article

printed in the RECORD.

In part he stated:

That is happening as I speak.

I certainly associate myself with the

comments of Senator SMITH.

That was the conclusion of the editorial.

I have questions, but I am not going

to take too much time to go over all

the questions I have as a result of the

statements that have been made. But

in regard to Kosovo, what is the end

state? What do we want to see in

Kosovo once we are done doing whatever

it is we plan to do?

If we don’t want to support the independence

and secession of the

Kosovars, why are we serving as their

air force?

How do we know we have ever attained

our aims?

What are the measures of merit?

How long might it take?

We have talked about an exit strategy.

I think we should focus on strategy;

that is, on what we are trying to

achieve, through what means, and how

do we know we are done?

I don’t accept the argument in regard

to NATO credibility, or that NATO

credibility is on the line, as an answer

to why we should go there. NATO’s

credibility is sky high. Just ask all the

nations who want to get in.

How is bombing conducive to peaceful

conflict resolution? Have we ever

been able to bomb a country into submission

so that they would agree with

our point of view? What if initial

strikes don’t attain the desired effect?

How far are we willing to go to compel

the Serbs to bend to our will? What are

the risks? Why send peacekeepers when

there is no peace to be kept and neither

side wants to compromise? It seems

that is the case.

Why are we seeking to compel a sovereign

nation—by the way, Yugoslavia

was a founding member of the U.N.—to

cede its territorial sovereignty to a

guerrilla movement? What message

does this send to other secessionists

worldwide?

How do you explain supporting

Yeltsin in fighting to keep Chechnya

within the Russian Federation, at a

cost of about 50,000 casualties—indeed,

comparing the Russian action to the

American Civil War and, by implication,

Yeltsin to Lincoln—and bombing

the Serbs for trying to keep their country

together? That is a point of view.

Which of the many Kosovar factions

are we supporting? How much top-down

control and professional discipline do

we expect from all sides involved?

The mission order for Bosnia, which

has been referred to as a good case

study for Kosovo, was, ‘‘Attack across

the Sava River,’’ and we went in with

overwhelming force, which we then

scaled down as the threat receded. We

are doing it the other way regarding

Kosovo. Why aren’t we following that

model? Remember the strategic insight

of an 18-year-old Marine in Beirut: ‘‘If

we are here to fight, we are too few; if

we are here to die, we are too many.’’

All of these questions I have mentioned—

some of which I share with a

great deal of support from others—I

think certainly should be debated,

should certainly come to the floor.

That has not been the case. I do hope

the administration will submit their

report soon. I hope they don’t submit

the report after the President has

given the order and the troops are

there, for at that time every Member of

the Senate and House will certainly

want to support our troops.

I worry about this, Mr. President. We

are going to war. The President has

spoken to the issue, other Cabinet officials

have spoken to the issue, but

many questions remain.

I yield the floor.